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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

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## PARLIAMENT BACKS CHURCHILL ON YALTA DECISIONS

SINCE the commitments undertaken at the Crimea Conference are of such far-reaching importance, many difficulties can be expected to arise in connection with their application despite the degree of Big Three unity manifested at Yalta and the cohesion of the Allied armies as they close their grip on the Nazis. This will be particularly true with respect to the plans, which are given only in outline form, for the joint occupation of Germany. But of greater immediate concern are the proposed establishment of a new Provisional Government for Poland, and the question of France's relationship to the Big Three—problems that indicate the difficulties still to be met in implementing the Yalta Declaration.

**BRITAIN'S REACTION TO YALTA.** Britain is particularly interested in the Polish and French questions, for the Polish Government-in-Exile resides in London and Britain bears special responsibility in devising a method whereby various elements of that group may be brought together in the new provisional régime. Britain is also greatly concerned over Anglo-French relations and the eventual status of France in Allied councils. It has been left largely to British statesmen to acquaint French officials with the import of the Yalta decisions.

In Britain most of the decisions taken by the three Allied leaders at Yalta have met with general approval. There is great satisfaction over the unity which the conference reflected, and both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden reported its achievements to Parliament in a full debate on foreign affairs on February 27-28. The Prime Minister asked for and received a vote of confidence from the House of Commons to demonstrate Britain's approval of the Crimea decisions.

On any vote concerning the Yalta commitments, the Churchill coalition expected to encounter little opposition. But there has been much anxiety among Conservatives in Parliament about the decisions con-

cerning Poland. Some of these members hoped that the confidence issue would not be framed directly, so that opinion opposed to the Polish solution could be expressed fully and openly. Poland figured prominently in the debate and, while few Conservative members were found in final opposition, they have consistently been unable to give their wholehearted support to the policy which has developed with respect to Poland.

**COMPROMISE ON POLAND.** The Crimea Conference provided for the setting up of a commission, consisting of Foreign Commissar Molotov and the British and American Ambassadors in Moscow, which would be charged with the task of consulting Polish leaders concerning formation of a new Provisional Government of National Unity for Poland. Once this commission is established, it must determine which of the Polish leaders now in London are to be asked to visit Moscow for the purpose of organizing the new government. That it will be difficult to achieve representation of the Government-in-Exile is forecast by the complete repudiation of the Yalta solution which the present Premier, M. Arciszewski, has expressed.

M. Mikolajczyk, former Polish Prime Minister and leader of the Peasant party, has also been reluctant to accept the proposed solution. While welcoming the pledge of the Yalta Declaration that a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland will be established, he has viewed the results of the conference respecting Polish borders largely as a national defeat. Having reached a definite agreement through compromise, however, Allied leaders will hardly brook opposition in the organization of a Polish government consisting of both London Poles and members of the Lublin group. The British attitude toward the Polish problem appears to resemble the view Prime Minister Churchill recently expressed in connection with the reconstruction of

the Yugoslav government. At that time Churchill announced that if the exiled King Peter did not agree to the reforms undertaken, royal assent would be presumed. While many Conservatives may find it difficult to concede that Russia carries great weight in Eastern European affairs, it has been Churchill's consistent policy during the war to accommodate the rise of Soviet power in that area, and most Britishers will hail with relief the Yalta solution of the Polish issue which has so long irritated Allied relations.

**FRANCE AND THE BIG THREE.** In the Parliamentary debate, Franco-British relations were also discussed, for there is concern in Britain lest the projected alliance with France be delayed. Moreover, there is no doubt that France expects further clarification of its status with the Big Three before the opening of the United Nations conference in San Francisco. French reaction to the Yalta Conference was clouded first by the fact that General de Gaulle was not invited to the meeting. Since the conference an important section of the French press has been critical of de Gaulle's refusal to meet with President Roosevelt at Algiers—the Communist press in particular differing on this issue with the General for the first time in the field of foreign affairs. Most Frenchmen, however, have backed de Gaulle in his insistence that France be considered in all arrangements respecting the final occupation of Germany.

It appears that French reaction to the proposed

United Nations Security Council is closely related to the alliances France has with Soviet Russia and, presumably, will sign with Britain in the near future. The Franco-Soviet pact of December 10, 1944, unlike the Anglo-Soviet pact of 1942, does not provide specifically that the alliance will be reviewed in light of arrangements agreed on in a world security system. The French alliance with Russia was originally conceived as an automatic guarantee. Now, however, the U.S.S.R. appears to approve referring the pact to the United Nations organization. Since Britain favors the closest relations with France, it devolves on Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, who have long supported France's revival, to assure France of its future role in Europe and in the world security system.

The British are anxious to conclude a binding agreement with France and probably with other nations across the English Channel. However, they insist, first, that any such regional arrangements are not incompatible with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and, second, that they are not designed as counteralliances against Russia. Contrary to the expectations of many, British reaction to the Franco-Soviet pact was favorable—on the ground that Britain's desire for closer ties between the Western European countries could not be looked on as anti-Russian if the Soviet Union were also tied to the Western countries by agreements similar to the 20-year alliance between Russia and Britain.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

## LIBERATED ITALY MOVES TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENT STATUS

The first concrete action toward restoration of sovereign independence for liberated Italy has now been taken by the Allies. Mr. Harold Macmillan, president of the Allied Commission, announced on February 24 a series of drastic changes affecting the relations between the Commission, which has hitherto enjoyed complete jurisdiction over Italian affairs for all practical purposes, and the Italian government, which has had only the most shadowy powers.

**WHAT ALLIED ACTION DOES FOR ITALY.** The significant content of this document can be very briefly summarized. It foreshadows a substantial reduction both of the personnel of the Commission and of the sphere of its active operation. The Commission will cease to exercise "control" except in those military zones along the battlefield where AMG will continue to function. For the remainder of liberated Italy, which is defined as all of the peninsula south of the northern boundaries of Viterbo, Rieti and Termano provinces, including Sardinia and Sicily, the Commission will serve in relation to the Italian government in a purely consultative and advisory capacity.

Specifically, this means that the Italian govern-

ment regains its freedom to conduct its foreign policy with Allied and neutral states, to issue laws and decrees without securing the consent of the Commission, and to make all appointments of personnel in the administration on its own responsibility. These important concessions must be read, however, in conjunction with Mr. Macmillan's simultaneous statement that "the requirements of the Italian campaign and overriding military needs must be protected and the rights of the Allied Governments will be held in reserve in the matter of day-to-day administration." In other words, the Italian government's freedom of action, as one would rightly suppose, is made contingent on the degree to which that action may conform with military necessities.

An arrangement such as this has been long foreshadowed. On September 26, 1944 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill issued jointly from Hyde Park a declaration in which they promised to review Italy's political and economic situation. Part of that declaration dealt specifically with the establishment of a new relationship between the Italian government and the Allied Control Commission, henceforth to be called the Allied Commission in anticipation of its altered character.

Weeks and months passed, however, without signs that this promise was being implemented. Early in January 1945, there was word from Rome that important decisions affecting the status of the Allied Commission were pending, but these, too, were premature. There were difficulties which had to be surmounted. One of these grew out of the political crisis which had precipitated the collapse of the first Bonomi government in November. Not only did the circumstances surrounding the establishment of a new Bonomi government, with only four of the six Liberation parties cooperating, interpose delays; but the differences in approach to the Italian problem between the United States and Britain, symbolized in Britain's veto of Count Sforza, had to be composed. The mere fact that the Allies see fit to act now in Italy's behalf indicates both that they have reasonable confidence in the stability of the present Italian government and that they have reached an accord between themselves on future policy toward that government.

From the Italian point of view the February 24 announcement is important chiefly for three reasons. First, it represents an abandonment of close tutelage which has been humiliating and psychologically depressing. In this sense, it will raise public morale and increase the prestige of the government. Second, it will probably protect the Italians against the recurrence of such actions as the British intervention to prevent the naming of Count Sforza as Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of the government. It would be possible, of course, to undertake such intervention on the ground of military necessity, but this will be difficult. In other words, a substantial amount of internal political independence will have been gained. Third, the action of the Allies will help clear the way toward solution of much more pressing questions, particularly in the field of economics and finance, which have been under negotiation for some time.

**WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE.** The problem of food is still the most urgent. Supplies of basic necessities are tragically inadequate and the black market continues to flourish. Some relief is promised by the application on March 1 of a more generous bread ration, a daily increase of 300 grams, guaranteed by the Allies in accordance with promises made by President Roosevelt as early as October 1944. The difficulty in finding shipping facilities with which the Allies can support this policy, while making other materials available, will remain,

however, so long as Western Europe is an active theatre of war.

At the same time, inflation continues and living costs mount. The Bonomi government has been trying to meet this situation but so far without much success. During the middle of February sweeping financial reforms were projected, including the abolition of bread subsidies, the simultaneous raising of wages and salaries, increased taxes, a kind of forced loan, and the confiscation of excess wealth accumulated since 1922. Such measures would tend to bring governmental expenditures and expected revenues closer into line with each other and at the same time help to halt the inflationary process. But, in the final analysis, this problem cannot be solved until there is a substantial arrangement with the Allies, whose military and occupation costs remain a first charge—and a heavy charge—on the Italian government. Eliminating or reducing these charges may be possible only in case the Allies are prepared to take Italy into a new political relationship with themselves, that is to say, to terminate Italy's status of "non-belligerency."

Technically, Italy remains a cobelligerent and is no closer than before to full membership in the United Nations, a goal which all Italian patriots hope to realize. Even more, they have long desired and long agitated for the publication of the Armistice terms and their modification. But these are still intact and still secret, and there is no indication of any intention to change them in the recently announced Allied policy.

The Italian problem continues to be an acute and difficult one. But progress is being made toward its solution, and the Allies' recent action is an important step in the right direction. Rumors still persist that a "provisional peace," first suggested in July 1944, is being contemplated; and there are clear signs that important economic and financial agreements with Italy are in the offing.

C. GROVE HAINES

*The Presidency and the Crisis*, by Louis W. Koenig. New York, King's Crown Press, 1944. \$2.00

Analyzes the use of the President's power from September 1939 to December 1941, in the severe testing period preceding our entry into the war.

*Navies in Exile*, by A. D. Divine. New York, E. P. Dutton, 1944. \$2.75


Dramatic stories of the navies that would not acknowledge defeat and that made such a valuable contribution to the Allies.

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# Washington News Letter



## WILL U.S. LOCAL INTERESTS BLOCK MEXICO WATER TREATY?

Action by the Senate will soon disclose whether one state, California, can cause the defeat of a treaty that is of interest to the nation as a whole. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations favorably reported the proposed United States-Mexico Water Treaty on February 23, but Senator Tom Connally of Texas, committee chairman, will not press for approval by the full Senate until the close of the conference of American Republics now taking place in Mexico City. The time interval may enable the Administration to bring the country to some understanding of the high meaning of the treaty in our international relations. For this is only one in a series of agreements with other governments that will require Senate ratification in the years ahead. If narrow, local interests are able to use the two-thirds rule on treaties to prevent a constructive, national solution of issues between the United States and Mexico, the effect will be most harmful on our relations with Latin America as a whole.

**PROBLEM OF THREE RIVERS.** The need for the treaty lies in the fact that the United States and Mexico share the waters of a number of rivers which rise in the United States: the Colorado, which flows for the last few miles of its length through Mexico; the Tijuana, which reaches the sea through Mexico; and the Rio Grande, which divides Texas from Mexico and whose course below Fort Quitman, Texas, is fed mainly from Mexican streams. A treaty allocation of United States waters to Mexico from the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman has been in force satisfactorily since its proclamation on January 16, 1907. The three rivers flow through dry regions that require irrigation for successful agriculture, and for irrigation both the United States and Mexico need a reasonably steady flow of water.

On August 19, 1935 Congress passed an Act authorizing the State Department to study with the Mexican government the question of dividing the waters from the three rivers. The treaty resulting from those studies was submitted to the Senate on February 15, 1944. It would guarantee to Mexico 1,500,000 acre-feet of water a year from the Colorado, allocate to the United States about half the water in the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman although far more than half of it originates in Mexico, and authorize an inquiry into the best means of conserving, using and allocating the waters of the Tijuana. The treaty would be administered by the

International Boundary Commission, which was organized in 1889.

The chief advocates of the treaty in the United States have been the Administration and the Committee of Fourteen and Fifteen of the Colorado River Basin States (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming), which seek a definition of the extent of Mexican rights to the use of Colorado River water. The Committee fears that, in the absence of a treaty, Mexico might use Colorado River water to an extent affecting the interests of the United States adversely. In Mexico "the irrigated acreage and the use of water both have been expanded" since the erection of Boulder Dam. Jean S. Breitenstein, attorney for the Colorado Water Conservation Board, wrote in a memorandum last September 20. "If this situation should continue and the Mexico development progress, a condition would exist in Mexico, similar to that which the upper basin feared would take place in Southern California."

### CALIFORNIA ARGUES AGAINST TREATY.

California, on the other hand, says that it fears Mexico will get too much water if the treaty goes into effect. Governor Earl Warren told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 5 that war veterans would be unable to take up public lands that would be irrigated by Boulder Dam water if Mexico shares the water. Yet the water "wasting through Mexican territory into the Gulf of California" amounts to 7,000,000 acre-feet a year, according to Secretary Stettinius.

Much of California's Colorado River water flows through the All-American Canal and feeds the Imperial Irrigation District. The District, an opponent of the treaty, has been selling water to Mexico for purposes that would be satisfied by the 1,500,000 acre-feet allotted under the treaty. Evan Newes, president of the District, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 20 that revenues from sales of water to Mexico in 1944 were \$299,240. The District is "afraid" that those revenues would be cut off if the treaty is ratified, Senator Connally said on February 12. Thirty-three votes against the treaty would kill it; it remains to be seen whether that many votes can be mobilized in support of a local view when the national interest calls for ratification.

BLAIR BOLLES

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